One-decoy state reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution
Li Xiang1, 2, Yuan Hua-Wei1, 2, Zhang Chun-Mei1, 2, ‡, Wang Qin1, 2
Institute of Quantum Information and Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China
Broadband Wireless Communication and Sensor Network Technology, Key Laboratory of Ministry of Education, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China

 

† Corresponding author. E-mail: cmz@njupt.edu.cn

Project supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant Nos. 2018YFA0306400 and 2017YFA0304100), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61590932, 11774180, and 61705110), and the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province for Leadingedge Technology Program, China (Grant No. BK20192001).

Abstract

Reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) has been proven to be very useful and practical under realistic environment. Here, we present a scheme for one-decoy state RFI-QKD based on the work of Rusca et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 112, 171104 (2018)], and carry out investigation on its performance under realistic experimental conditions. Numerical simulation results show that the one-decoy state RFI-QKD can achieve comparable performance in terms of secret key rate and transmission distance as the two-decoy state correspondence under practical experimental conditions. On contrast, it does not need to prepare the vacuum state in the former case, substantially reducing the experimental complexity and random number consumptions. Therefore, our present proposal seems very promising in practical implementations of RFI-QKD.

1. Introduction

Based on the principles of quantum mechanics, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a way of generating information-theoretic secure keys between two distant parties, Alice and Bob. Since the first BB84 protocol[1] was proposed, much effort has been made to improve practical performance of QKD systems.[24] Many QKD experiments have been successfully demonstrated either in laboratories or field environments,[513] paving the way towards large-scale commercialization of QKD systems.

In most QKD systems, a shared reference frame is needed for Alice and Bob, which inevitably increases the cost and makes the QKD system more complicated. Fortunately, the reference-frame-independent QKD (RFI-QKD) protocol[14] was proposed by Laing et al., which can generate secret keys even with slowly drifted reference frames. Up to date, there are plenty of theoretical and experimental works were carried out on RFI-QKD.[1521] Moreover, due to the security property of MDI protocol, MDI-QKD has attracted more and more attention recently. Combined with RFI-QKD, there are some experiments on RFI-MDI.[22,23]

On the other hand, deterministic single-photon sources are still not available, and weak coherent laser pulses are usually used in most QKD systems. It brings a chance for eavesdropper (usually called Eve) to exploit the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack.[2426] To combat the PNS attack, the decoy-state method[2,2729] has been adopted in practical QKD systems, where different number of decoy states can be employed. Recently, Rusca et al.[30] did investigation on one-decoy state BB84 QKD. In their work, it is demonstrated that the one-decoy state method can show advantages for most experimental settings.

In this paper, different from Rusca et al.[30] work which focused on BB84 protocol, we extend one-decoy state method to RFI-QKD and propose a scheme of one-decoy state RFI-QKD, and further compare its performance with two-decoy state correspondence by taking statistical fluctuation analysis into account. Simulation results demonstrate that our one-decoy state RFI scheme can achieve comparable performance as two-decoy state correspondence in terms of secret key rates and transmission distances.

2. One-decoy state scheme

In the one-decoy state RFI-QKD, Alice adopts two intensities (λ ∈ {μ,v}) and three orthogonal basis (ZA, XA, and YA) to prepare quantum states, then Bob measures those states with basis ZB, XB, and YB. Generally speaking, the Z basis can be well aligned for common encoding schemes, and the X and Y basis are allowed to drift slowly with an unknown angle β. That is, the Z, X, and Y basis satisfy ZB = ZA, XB = cosβ XA + sinβYA, and YB = cosβ YA – sinβ XA. Usually, the Z basis is used to generate the final secret keys, the X and Y bases are used to estimate Eve’s information.

After the quantum communication phase, the practical detection probability and quantum-bit error-rate (QBER) with intensity λ of quantum states that Alice sends in ξA basis and Bob measures in ξB basis can be given as

where λ∈ {μ,ν}, i denotes the number of photons, PξA (PξB) is the probability that Alice (Bob) choose the ξA (ξB) basis, Pλ denotes the probability that Alice prepare states with intensity λ, Pi(λ) is the i-photon distribution of intensity λ, Yi and ei denote the yield and error rate of i-photon states. Concretely, considering the probability of a photon arriving at the erroneous single-photon detector, denoted as ed, QBER can be calculated by Eq. (14) in Ref. [31], and for simulation, two threshold single-photon detectors are adopted at Bob’s side, and the probability of the valid detection events conditional on i-photon states is[31]

where Y0 is the dark count rate of single-photon detectors.

Considering the post-processing speed of a QKD system mainly depends on the block size being processed, i.e., the number of pulses detected by Bob in Z basis within certain time window, here in our analysis, we assume the block size with a fixed value (nZZ). We can get the corresponding number of pulses that need to be sent (Ntot) by Alice with

in which

Then we can get the number of detection nξAξB and the number of errors mξAξB corresponding to basis ξAξB

where

Through the following equation, we can calculate the fraction of nξAξB corresponding to a certain intensity λ

Similarly, the number of errors caused by pulses of intensity λ is

In the following, let us take the finite-data size effect[30,32] into account. We can obtain the relation between the observed variables () and the corresponding asymptotic case () by Hoeffding’s inequality as follows:

where the above inequalities hold with probabilities 1 – 2ε1 and 1 – 2ε2, respectively, and .

According to Ref. [30], the upper bound and the lower bound of () are given by

The lower-bound of single-photon events, the lower-bound and the upper-bound of vacuum events in basis ξAξB can be estimated with the following formulae

where τi = λμ,νPλeλλi/i! is the total probability to send an i-photon state, L and U denote the lower bound and the upper bound, respectively.

The upper bound of single-photon error rate , and the upper bound of single-photon bits errors in the ξAξB basis can be expressed as follows:

In an RFI-QKD, an intermediate quantity C can be used to monitor Eve’s information, given by

Normally, one can extract out secure keys under the condition that in an RFI protocol, and estimate Eve’s information with

where

and h(x) = –xlog2(x) – (1 – x)log2(1 – x) is the binary entropy function.

As we know, the formula on calculating the secret keys of BB84 protocol has been addressed in Refs. [30,32]

where is the upper bound of the phase-error rate, λEC refers to the number of discarded bits during the error correction stage, εsec and εcor each corresponds to the secrecy and correctness parameters. a and b depend on the specific security analysis taken into account.[30,32]

Through similar method, we can deduce out the formula on calculating the secret key rate for RFI-QKD as

where

which is the security parameter in one-decoy RFI-QKD, and the coefficients in the front of the term ε1 and ε2 are equal to the number of times of the inequalities (10) and (11) that implemented in the secret key length formula, respectively. α1, α2, α3, and γ are the error terms. Comparing the security parameter between our present work and Refs. [30,32], the difference is the number of estimated parameters, a holds the same value as 6. For simplicity, here we set each error term with a common value ε, and obtain εsec = 43ε. Therefore, b = 43.

3. Numerical simulations

In this section, we first simulate the value of C for both one-decoy and two-decoy state RFI-QKDs under different rotation angles (β), and further do comparison between their key generation rates under the same experimental conditions. Finally, we investigate the effect of the finite-data size on one-decoy RFI-QKD, we study the performance of the one-decoy state RFI-QKD with different block sizes (nZZ). It should be noted that, the efficiency of the detector and the internal losses of Bob’s apparatus are included in the value of global attenuation η in our simulations. The experimental parameters used for simulations are all listed in Table 1.

Table 1.

List of device parameters for simulations. Y0 is the dark count rate of single-photon detectors; ed is the misalignment error rate of optical systems; f is the error correction efficiency; εsec and εcor correspond to privacy and correctness parameters.

.

In Fig. 1, we investigate the value of C in one-decoy state and two-decoy state RFI-QKDs with different relative rotation angles of reference frames (β ∈ {0°, 10°, 20°, 30°}). The performance of both schemes deteriorates with the increase of β, which is attributed to the smearing of correlations of and , , , , and thus poor estimation of C. As we can see from Fig. 1, when the relative rotation angle is small, the values of C in the one-decoy state RFI-QKD is almost the same as that in the two-decoy state method. While when the rotation angle is getting larger, i.e., > 20°, the value of C in the one-decoy state scheme becomes lower than that in the two-decoy state method, representing worse parameter estimations of the one-decoy state scheme under this circumstance.

Fig. 1. Values of C for one-decoy state RFI-QKD at different relative rotation angles (β ∈{0°, 10°, 20°, 30°}). The lines from top to bottom denote the results of β = 0°, 10°, 20°, and 30°, respectively. Here we set block size nZZ = 106.

Figure 2 shows comparisons of the key rate between our present one-decoy state RFI-QKD and former two-decoy state RFI-QKDs under different rotation angles of reference frames. For general, we did not consider the dead time of single-photon detectors cDT as in Ref. [30], which mainly affects the high-speed systems on the key generation rate in the initial global attenuation. Simulation results show that our present results can exhibit better performance than the latter when relative rotation angle β is small (< 20°), benefiting from the less sensitive finite size effect in the one-decoy state method. While as the relative rotation angle β is getting larger (>20°), the key rate of the latter scheme exceeds the former, which is mainly due to the worse parameter estimations of the one-decoy state scheme, as indicated with the C value in Fig. 1. That is, with the relative rotation angle β is getting larger, the correlations of , , , and are smearing, which results in the C value in the one-decoy state RFI-QKD getting worse faster than that in the two-decoy state RFI-QKD, and will affect the key generation rate.

Fig. 2. Comparison of the key rate between the one-decoy state and the two-decoy state RFI-QKDs at different rotation angles β, where the SKR difference denoted by (R1R2)/R2. Lines from top to bottom represent β = 0°, 10°, 20°, and 30°, respectively. Here we set block size nZZ = 106.

In order to investigate the effect of the finite-data size on the one-decoy RFI-QKD, we compare the performance of the one-decoy state RFI-QKD with different sizes of block while setting the relative rotation angle with 20° (nZZ ∈ {105, 106, 107, 108}), as shown in Fig. 3. Obviously, the performance of the one-decoy state RFI-QKD will increase when the block size is getting larger. While when the block size is relatively larger, e.g., > 107, the key rate is not sensitive to the finite data-size effect. Therefore, proper block sizes should be chosen in practical applications of the present scheme.

Fig. 3. Key rates versus global attention for the one-decoy RFI-QKD with different block sizes (nZZ ∈ {105, 106, 107, 108}). Lines from bottom to top denote the results of nZZ = 105, 106, 107, 108, individually. Here we set β = 20°.
4. Conclusion

In summary, we have proposed a scheme on one-decoy state reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution, and investigate its performance under realistic environments. Numerical simulation results show that, the performance of our present scheme can exceed traditional two-decoy state RFI-QKD when the rotation angle of reference frame is not larger, e.g., < 20°. Moreover, it does not need to prepare the vacuum state in the former, and thus reduce the experimental complexity of QKD systems. Therefore, our present work could provide valuable references for practical implementation of the RFI-QKD.

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